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Belief and unbelief: 
Two sides of a coin
Grace Davie
In what follows I build on to previous writing relating to the nature of 
religion (including religious belief) in modern Europe and the factors 
that must be taken into account if this is to be properly understood 
(Davie 1994, 2000, 2002, 2006). These factors are: 
•  the cultural heritage of Europe; 
•  the ‘old’ model of a moderately dominant state church which 
operates like a public utility; 
•  a ‘newer’ model which takes the form of a growing market in 
religion; 
•  the arrival into Europe of new groups of people both Christian 
and other; 
•  an increasingly articulate secular lobby. 
The first point to grasp is that all five exist alongside each other 
and that they push and pull in different directions. The second point 
provides the focus for this article: namely that exactly the same factors 
that account for the nature of religious belief in European society are 
equally present in unbelief. I will take each of them in turn in order to 
illustrate this point. 
Cultural heritage 
Both religious belief and its obverse unbelief are part of culture: they 
do not exist in a vacuum. In the European case, both have been formed 
by the Judaeo-Christian tradition which has been part of our heritage 
for two millennia and – whether we like it or not – has defined the 




belief in this part of the world are rejecting a culturally determined 
version of this. Many of them, moreover (articulate atheists included), 
know a great deal about the God in which they do not believe. In 
Europe, this is a Christian God. That is not to say that the Judaeo-
Christian tradition is the only formative factor to take into account in 
the evolution of Europe. Greek rationalism and Roman organisation 
are equally significant. The first of these becomes a crucial element in 
the markedly secular European Enlightenment. 
The old model: religion as a public utility 
The Constantinian settlement in the fourth century ensured that the 
dominant forms of European religion have been embedded in territory; 
first in the form of empire and then in the form of the nation state. 
Since the Reformation, the major expression of religious life in Europe 
can be found in a state or legally-privileged church – recognising that 
the specific theology associated with this institution varies in different 
parts of the continent. Historically these churches were powerful 
institutions able to coerce unwilling populations over which they 
had authority – they could be, indeed they often were, excluding and 
exclusive. Happily that power no longer exists; instead there has been 
a distinctive mutation. In the liberal democracies of modern Europe, 
state churches operate as public utilities: they are there at the point of 
need for those who live in the country in question – an inclusiveness 
repeated at diocesan and parish level. These are territorially-defined 
institutions which work on a model of opting out rather than opting in. 
Unless they declare otherwise – which they are entirely free to do – all 
those who live in a designated area ‘belong’ to the church. For this 
reason, such churches encompass a huge range of belief and unbelief. 
The ways in which these relationships are put into practice vary 
considerably in different parts of Europe. France and Norway offer 
instructive examples in terms of the argument of this article, not only 
because of the nature of their respective churches but because the 
communities of unbelief in each country form mirror images of these 
institutions. In France, for example, a hegemonic Catholic Church 
proscribed the possibility of religious alternatives considerably longer 
than elsewhere. Religious persecution persisted right through the 
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seventeenth century, culminating in the Revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes in 1685. De facto toleration began to emerge in the following 
century. De jure toleration for the much reduced Protestant and Jewish 
communities came just ahead of the Revolution in 1787. 
An important consequence of this situation lies in the fact that 
the definitive challenge to the Catholic Church came eventually from 
a self-consciously secular state rather than a religious minority – a 
‘battle’ which culminated in the establishment of the Third Republic in 
1870. The French state moreover claimed for itself the moral qualities 
previously associated with the Catholic Church, underpinning its 
authority with a carefully articulated secular philosophy. Laïcité is 
difficult to translate into English but means effectively the absence 
of religion in the public square – it is an ideological as much as a 
descriptive term. It can however be interpreted variously: at one end 
of the spectrum it is a relatively neutral concept; at the other it denotes 
a militant, anti-clerical stance – at times tipping over into a mistrust of 
all religion. Whatever the case it is quintessentially French and derives 
from a very particular religious past. 
Norway is different. Here the community of humanists (a 
surprisingly large proportion of the population as a whole) reflects the 
characteristics of the majority church – that is a Lutheran state church 
supported by church tax.1 The relatively wealthy Norwegian Humanist 
Association is similarly financed – paradoxically in the sense that the 
philosophical views embraced by this organisation lead it to oppose 
rather than support the notion of a state church. A second similarity 
can be found in the efforts made by Norwegian humanists to establish 
equivalent liturgies to the Lutheran Church, notably those associated 
with birth, adolescence (coming of age) and death. This is necessary 
in a population where significant numbers of individuals continue to 
seek the services of the church at the turning points in life. Norwegian 
humanists, finally, have forthright views – there can be no doubt about 
this – but they are expressed in typically Norwegian ways. They are 
very different in tone and content from their rather more aggressive 
French equivalents. 
In parenthesis, an interesting comparison can be made with the 
United States. Unbelief – or more accurately, no-religion2 – is growing 
in America, but from a very low base; the constituency remains 
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considerably smaller than it is in Europe. Why? There are many 
reasons for this difference, but among them it is worth reflecting on 
the absence of a dominant church. There is, instead, an almost infinite 
variety of denominations from which the believer can choose, chopping 
and changing at will. But if there is no dominant church against which 
to react, how will the ‘opposition’ (the secular) understand itself? One 
point is clear: many Americans observe with disquiet the growing 
dominance of what is known as the New Christian Right, the more 
so given its evident political influence. It is also clear that the culture 
wars of modern America show no sign of diminishing. If anything, the 
reverse is true: secular liberals continue to oppose moral conservatives 
on a wide range of issues. Resistance to the NCR, however, is as 
likely to be found in the different currents of Christianity as it is in 
secularism as such – there are plenty of alternatives on offer. A second 
point follows from this: in the United States there is not only no state 
church, but no notion of the state in the sense that this is understood in 
Europe, and – still less – any idea that the state might claim for itself 
the moral authority normally associated with a church. Secularists, 
just like churches, in the United States must discover alternative ways 
to sustain themselves. 
An incipient market in religion 
All over Europe, however, the residue of the state church (the public 
utility) is gradually – and in many cases only very partially – giving 
way to something different: a growing market in religion, in which a 
wide range of organisations compete for the attention of a public that 
becomes increasingly aware of the religious or spiritual ‘goods’ on 
offer. They choose accordingly; in other words they opt in, not out. 
The important point to grasp is that these choices vary in nature, and 
that they include unbelief as well as belief – a very different situation 
from that outlined above. It is equally clear that there are gainers and 
losers in this situation on both sides of the equation, an inevitable 
effect of the market. We need to ask therefore what kinds of belief and 
unbelief are proving attractive in late modernity? 
In terms of unbelief, an interesting question arises. I have argued 
elsewhere (Davie 2006) that the forms of religious organisation and 
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associated belief that are gaining in market terms are those that are 
best described as experiential rather than the purely cerebral, noting 
that this was not what social scientists of religion who were active 
in the mid post-war decades had anticipated. Such scholars had 
assumed that the forms of religion that were most ‘rational’ (i.e. those 
which engaged most easily with the modern world) would be those 
most likely to flourish in the late twentieth century. Such is not the 
case, a point on which the evidence is unequivocal.3 The forms of 
religion that are currently prospering are on the whole conservative 
in their theological outlook, frequently combining this with a softer, 
experiential ‘style’. It is worth asking whether the same is true of 
unbelief, an approach that leads in turn to further questions. What, 
for example, might experiential atheism look like and how might this 
be expressed? The answer is not immediately clear. At one level it is 
true that atheists, just like believers, respond to what are called ‘peak 
experiences’. At another, the fact that the criticisms that unbelievers 
direct towards religion are so often based on the primacy of reason 
must surely favour the rational over the expressive. A third point is 
worth pondering. Believers are very often exposed to the experiential 
in the course of worship. It is built into the liturgy and becomes an 
essentially shared activity. Is there an equivalent for unbelievers who 
– by definition – do not engage in such activities? 
New arrivals 
Returning to the central theme of this paper, it is quite clear that the 
old and the new models of religion exist side by side in twenty-first 
century Europe and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future 
(this is not a free market in the American sense). And in many ways 
the system works well: each economy fills the gaps left by the other. 
Those who wish to choose do so amongst an ever-growing range of 
options; those who have no interest in choosing rely on the public 
utility. That, however, is not the whole story, given that new groups 
of people are arriving into Europe all the time, bringing with them 
new ways of being religious – thus extending the range of choice 
still further. Not all of these people are Christians, though many are. 
In Britain, for example, Afro-Caribbean churches have captured a 
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significant slice of the market and display not only experiential but 
exuberant styles of worship. 
Even more important for the argument presented here are the 
other-faith populations – notably, but not exclusively, the Muslim 
communities. Not because they are particularly numerous (they are 
not), but because they are challenging the deeply held conviction 
among the great majority of Europeans that belief is a private matter. 
The reason is simple enough. Islam forms part of a very different 
cultural heritage in which religion is not a discrete activity as it has 
become in the West, but a way of life. In the ummah, the religious 
and the secular are inseparable from each other and both, it follows, 
are present in the public sphere. But how does this practice operate 
beyond the ummah – that is, in those parts of the world where Muslims 
live in diaspora? 
It is at this point that the debate about both belief and unbelief 
in Europe becomes noticeably more intense. In many ways, the 
strength of the reactions is hardly surprising, given – once again – 
the expectations of an earlier generation of scholars. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, social scientists were very largely agreed that the public 
significance of religion would be likely to decline as the century 
drew to a close, but that private belief might endure for longer in 
the private sphere. The former point is admirably illustrated by the 
work of Bryan Wilson who went so far as to define secularisation as 
the decline in the social significance of religion in modern societies 
(Wilson 1969). The latter found expression in the phrase for which I 
am largely responsible: ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 1994). 
Paradoxically, exactly the reverse has happened: private belief 
(unsustained by any kind of institution) is dwindling fast, especially in 
northern Europe, but religion as such has re-entered the public sphere. 
Dramatically so at times. 
A whole series of episodes illustrate this point. In the 1990s 
critically important debates concerning the place of religion in modern 
societies took place in Britain and France. In Britain, the Rushdie 
controversy raised crucial issues about the freedom of speech and 
its obvious counterpart – the freedom of belief. Pushed to the limit, 
they inevitably collide. In France the affaire du foulard provided a 
similar catalyst, focusing this time on what could and could not be 
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worn in ‘public’ institutions, notably the state and the school system. 
In the new millennium, the Dutch, Danish, Swiss and Swedish cases 
have moved centre stage, each of them triggered by a specific and 
seemingly irresolvable event or issue. All of these episodes moreover 
are inextricably linked with what is happening worldwide – a scenario 
in which 1979 emerges as a key date. It was at this moment that Shah 
and his family fled from Iran, displaced by a regime motivated by 
conservative readings of Islam. It was, of course, the Iranian ayatollah 
who pronounced the fatwa threatening the life of Salman Rushdie – a 
turning point in the controversy as a whole. 
Secular reactions 
I will argue that it is the reassertion of religion in the public sphere 
which has provoked a considerably more hostile reaction among 
certain kinds of secularist – a group who can be relatively relaxed 
about the private convictions of their fellow citizens, but who resist 
strongly the encroachments of religion in public life. Dominant 
among these people are the new atheists, who in many ways adopt 
the characteristics of the forms of religion that they most dislike. 
The argument runs as follows and rests on a particular understanding 
of fundamentalism, defining this as ‘a world view that highlights 
specific essential “truths” of traditional faiths and applies them with 
earnestness and fervor to twentieth-century realities’ (Kaplan 1992, 
5). Both parts of this definition are crucial – the existence of essential 
truths and their application to twentieth-century realities. For this 
reason, the word fundamentalism should not be used to describe the 
traditional elements of religions that have been left untouched by the 
modern world, nor does it mean the creation of entirely new ideas. It 
involves the re-affirming of essential truths within a situation that has 
been disturbed, either by new forms of scholarship or by the pressures 
of an expanding global economy and the effects that this has on social, 
political or ideological life. 
Can this approach be applied to secular as well as religious 
worldviews? I believe this to be the case (Davie 2007, 195–99). 
Such worldviews, moreover, include secularism – for the following 
reasons. In many ways, secularism (rightly or wrongly) has become 
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the assumed ideology of modern Europe: both scholars and activists 
expected a future that was more rather than less secular, even if belief 
endured in the private sphere. The return of religion to public discussion 
is therefore anomalous; it undermines the status quo and becomes a 
‘problem’ to be resolved. One reaction (among many others) has been 
a regrouping amongst secularists to re-state and re-affirm the essential 
truths of their position: it is this that constitutes ‘new’ atheism. Its 
nature – moreover – is strikingly similar to the notion of religious 
fundamentalism as this set out above and as it is developed in the 
‘Fundamentalism Project’ (Marty and Appleby 1991). A core feature 
of the latter’s work is an ideal-type of fundamentalism. Not every 
feature of the ideal-type is present in new atheism; without doubt, 
however, it is essentially re-active in its nature and is dominated by an 
elite who think in black and white terms, and who aim in their public 
announcements to disturb, and indeed to shock. Such an approach is 
helpful in that it demonstrates very clearly why the advent of new 
atheism coincides with the return of religion to the public sphere. This 
is not a zero sum game: each encourages the other. 
That said, it is equally important to remember that not all 
unbelievers are sympathetic either to the ideas or to the methods of 
new atheists. Indeed, the views of unbelievers – like the adherents 
of all world faiths – lie along a spectrum. At one end their ideas are 
barely distinguishable from those of ‘believers’ – particularly the ones 
who remain distanced from institutional religion; at the other can be 
found a sharpness of expression that borders on aggression. It is the 
latter that displays at times the characteristics of fundamentalism. 
Concluding remarks 
One further point concludes this article. It concerns what has become 
known as European exceptionalism (Davie 2002). The essential point 
is easily summarised: Europeans are gradually beginning to realise 
that Europe is secular not because it is modern, but because it is 
European. For this reason, explanations for the relative secularity of 
Europe must be sought in the specificities of European history, not in 
an oversimple elision of the secular and the modern. Secularisation, 
in other words, is not an inevitable part of the modernisation story; 
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it occurs in some parts of the modern world but not in others. It is 
also true that some Europeans welcome this insight, others are 
disconcerted by it. Among the former are those who use this argument 
to resist the encroachments of new forms of religion from outside; 
among the latter are those who simply assumed that what Europe did 
today in terms of religion or indeed secularity, everyone else would do 
tomorrow. Such is not the case. Indeed quite the opposite is true: the 
great majority of the modern world remains as ‘furiously religious as 
it ever was’ (Berger 1999, 2). 
The crucial point to recall with respect to the argument presented 
here is that European secularism or unbelief – in just the same way as 
European religion or belief – is not for export. Both must be seen as 
an integral part of the evolution of Europe (a relatively restricted part 
of the world) and must be understood in these terms.
Notes
1 It is important to note that the legal and financial position of the 
Church of Norway is currently under review.
2 This section of the population is known as the ‘nones’, in the sense 
that they do not belong to any church. A significant number of 
them, however, continue to believe in God (Pew Forum 2008).
3 In the 1960s, for example, the future seemed bright for various 
forms of liberal Protestantism; some forty to fifty years later, there 
are two rather different success stories: charismatic evangelical 
churches both inside and outside the mainstream and – less intui-
tively – cathedrals or city-centre churches (Davie 2006). 
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